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Austerity and gender inequalities in 
Europe in times of crisis
Cristiano Perugini, Jelena Žarković Rakić and Marko Vladisavljević*
The post-2008 recession and the countercyclical responses by European govern-
ments that followed triggered an extensive wave of fiscal adjustments. Although 
underpinned by widespread consensus, the implementation of such measures has 
also been severely criticised. While their effect on output and employment has been 
extensively investigated, their impact on wage inequality has received less attention. 
In this paper, we focus on the consequences of fiscal consolidation measures for 
gender inequality. After describing the literature-based conceptual framework of 
our analysis, we provide empirical evidence of the effect of fiscal consolidation on: 
(i) the adjusted gender wage gap, and (ii) the patterns of gender horizontal segrega-
tion. The analysis covers EU-28 countries in the years 2010–13. Results show that 
austerity measures (both tax-based and expenditure-based) impacted significantly 
on various aspects of gender wage inequality, putting at risk the relatively little pro-
gress achieved in Europe so far.
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1. Introduction
As a response to the macroeconomic consequences of the post-2008 recession, in par-
ticular high public sector deficits and sovereign debt problems, many European Union 
countries implemented fiscal consolidation programmes, often referred to as auster-
ity measures. The largest were introduced in the 2010–12 period in Hungary, Latvia, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (Leschke et al., 2015). Although such packages 
differed in size and structure, most of them included cuts in public sector wages and 
employment or in public services; some countries embraced policies on the revenue 
side, such as value-added tax hikes. The effectiveness of fiscal consolidation policies 
on growth has been extensively questioned, as has their effect on the labour market, 
inequality and social stability.
The austerity debate goes back to the origins of economic thought and is related 
to the desirable extent of state intervention into the economy. Konzelmann (2014) 
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provides a thorough and exhaustive overview of the austerity debate in the history of 
economic thought, starting from the different, historically based positions of classical 
economists such as Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, through to the neoclassical school, 
the Keynesian era and the growing dominance of neoliberal ideology from the 1970s. 
Under neoliberalism, policy intervention aimed at achieving full employment has been 
progressively marginalised, while austerity has increasingly been regarded as a cru-
cial mean of facilitating macroeconomic equilibrium via price stability. Despite the 
questionable results obtained by neoliberal policies in favouring growth, support for 
austerity packages gained strength and became, after emergency monetary measures, 
the most common response to the 2008 recession. Some influential studies provided 
justification for the widespread adoption of austerity; illustrative examples include evi-
dence that excessive debt is detrimental to growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) and 
that fiscal consolidation has an expansionary effect by increasing private sector con-
fidence in a Ricardian equivalence logic (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). These find-
ings were severely criticised in the following years (e.g. Kinsella, 2012; Herndon et al., 
2014; Considine and Duffy, 2016), with a number of studies showing that austerity 
aggravated the effects of the recession and hit asymmetrically the weakest social and 
economic groups (Crotty, 2012; Donald et al., 2014). In this context, the impact of 
fiscal consolidation on gender inequality represents a particularly interesting analytical 
perspective, and is the focus of this paper.
The crisis is reported to have disproportionally hit male employment, as it most dir-
ectly affected the male-dominated private sectors (Perivier, 2018). However, what was 
first seen as ‘he-cession’ soon after moved to ‘sh(e)austerity’ (Karamessini and Rubery, 
2014). Post-crisis austerity measures such as cuts in public sector wages and employ-
ment allegedly impacted women more than men, as women constitute the majority 
of the workforce in such sectors. Similarly, cuts in tax credits, social benefits and care 
services could have impacted the quantity and the quality of the labour supplied by 
women and reshaped gender roles within the household.
In examining the effect of austerity measures on gender inequality, most of the 
literature to date has dealt with the impact on employment, in particular related to 
policy interventions in the public sector. On the wage side, attention has been lim-
ited to the impact of fiscal consolidation (wage cuts or freezes for public employees) 
on the raw gender pay gap, that is, on the simple difference in average hourly wages 
between men and women. However, austerity measures on public sector wages (e.g. 
a wage cut), while affecting the raw gender gap in the total economy due to a com-
position effect, impact both men and women symmetrically within the sector. As a 
result, the gender wage gap ‘adjusted’ for job and worker characteristics (i.e. which 
is often ascribed to pure gender discrimination) is expected to remain unaffected. 
The distinctive feature of our paper is that we are interested in investigating whether 
austerity increased the scope of gender discrimination practices, that is, increased 
the gender wage gap once differences in men and women’s labour market character-
istics have been controlled for. Our working hypothesis is that fiscal consolidation 
plans, via budget cuts for care policies and social services, disproportionately impact 
women’s ability to supply the requested level of effort, continuity and flexibility on 
the job. This could exacerbate gender pay inequality by decreasing women’s capacity 
to attain better-paid work positions and by driving downward employers’ expecta-
tions of women’s productivity.
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Our analysis covers EU-28 countries in the years 2010–13 and uses data from the 
European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The structure 
of the article is as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 provides an overview of 
the evidence available so far in the literature and a discussion of the possible gendered 
impacts of austerity policies. Section 3 illustrates the micro-level datasets and the vari-
ables used, and provides some descriptive evidence on the levels and components of 
the gender wage gap in Europe. Section 4 describes the data and the indicators used 
as metrics of fiscal consolidation and provides some preliminary evidence on their 
possible links with gender inequality. In Sections 5 and 6, we present our econometric 
models and results. Specifically, Section 5 deals with the estimates of the impact of 
austerity on the adjusted gender wage gap; Section 6 with the effects of austerity on 
gender segregation. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Austerity and gender inequalities
The position of men and women in the labour market, reflected in the level of sec-
torial and occupational segregation, is critical to understanding the consequences of 
the great recession. As the crisis hit sectors where the workforce was predominantly 
male, such as construction, manufacturing and certain branches of finance, the effect 
of the economic downturn was that labour market conditions deteriorated more for 
men than for women (Rubery, 2015). The consequent fall in gender disparity observed 
in Europe after 2008 in terms of employment, unemployment, activity and poverty 
rates was not a sign of improving gender equality, but rather of the fact that men had 
moved closer to the most vulnerable positions of women (Bettio and Verashchagina, 
2014; Ferreira, 2014; Gonzales Gago and Segales Kirzner, 2014; Addabbo et al., 2015; 
Perugini, 2017).
Austerity policies that target the public sector, where women are normally over-
represented, are similarly supposed to produce gendered effects (Glasmeier and 
Lee-Chuvala, 2011). However, the literature that tries to determine how widespread 
‘she-austerity’ was in terms of job losses is still very limited. Using a panel of eight EU 
countries with different welfare and gender regimes for the period 2008–14, Perivier 
(2018) shows that the change from ‘he-cession to sh(e)austerity’ in Europe was limited 
to Greece and Spain and, to a lesser extent, to the UK and Denmark.
Evidence regarding the impact of austerity measures on gender pay inequality, the 
focus of this paper, is likewise scarce. Fulton (2011) shows that in Latvia, women’s 
pay in the public sector has fallen disproportionately as a result of austerity measures, 
causing the raw gender pay gap in the whole economy to rise from 15.2% in 2008 to 
16.9% in 2011. In Romania, the raw gender pay gap widened from 7.8% in 2008 to 
12.6% in 2010. However, the peak austerity year in Romania was 2010, when public 
sector employment was dramatically cut and public sector wages were reduced by 25% 
(Stoiciu, 2012).
Besides these direct effects of austerity on the raw gender gap, fiscal consolidation 
policies could have a number of indirect effects. Budget cuts to alternatives to wom-
en’s unpaid labour, such as childcare and social and eldercare services, could cause 
lower female labour participation and also decrease the effort, flexibility and continu-
ity that women are able to put into their job. In Spain, plans to invest in pre-primary 
school infrastructure were cancelled and significant cuts in long-term care introduced 
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(Gonzales Gago and Segales Kirzner, 2014); in Italy, austerity has paused the expan-
sion of childcare services (Verashchagina and Capparucci, 2014), leading to further 
constraints on mothers’ labour supply (Addabbo et al., 2015). In Greece, reduced state 
budget allocations to municipalities caused a huge decrease in social care staff and the 
closure of childcare facilities (Karamessini, 2014). In other countries, such as Portugal, 
means testing was introduced for benefits to which women had previously independ-
ent access (Ferreira, 2014). Ireland reduced the amount of child benefits paid dir-
ectly to mothers (Barry and Conroy, 2014), while Spain abolished them completely 
(Gonzales Gago and Segales Kirzner, 2014). Ireland also reduced allowances claimed 
mainly by women looking after elderly or disabled relatives and the contraction in 
social services resulted in poorer special needs assistance and fewer public nursing 
home places (Barry and Conroy, 2014). In the UK, a range of measures reduced sup-
port for children, pregnancy and childcare. Child benefits and working tax credits were 
frozen, baby- and pregnancy-related grants were reduced and pressure was exerted on 
single mothers (as benefit recipients) to increase their efforts to find work (Adam and 
Brown, 2013; Rubery and Raferty, 2014).
Austerity measures developed in response to the crisis have, therefore, generally 
led to a retrenchment of the welfare state in childcare and long-term care services, 
which puts pressure on families to provide informal welfare support, usually in the 
form of female unpaid labour. This could affect the flexibility of female labour supply, 
reducing women’s chances of being employed in better-paid sectors and challenging 
achieved levels of integration in the labour market. The longer-run effects of women’s 
more limited contribution to household income could materialise as deterioration in 
the achieved levels of overall gender equality and endangerment of women’s emanci-
pation and autonomy (Ferreira, 2014). In other words, income loss stemming from a 
decline in employment, benefits and pensions during austerity episodes, coupled with 
reduced support for work/family reconciliation policies, is expected to reduce female 
bargaining power within the household and to reinforce the patriarchal family struc-
tures (Perivier, 2018).
Evidence supports this hypothesis for example in Germany, where measures focus-
ing on short-term work schemes were implemented as a response to the crisis, in con-
tinuity with the structural reforms embedded in the Hartz programme which clearly 
favoured a conservative, male-centred family model. The Hartz reforms significantly 
eroded entitlements to benefits in particular for women, first of all by increasingly 
conditioning unemployment benefits to household resources (rather than to an indi-
vidual reference wage) and by giving more room to family solidarity. At the same 
time, reforms imposed wage moderation especially in (female-dominated) services 
and public sectors (Lehndorff, 2015). When the crisis hit, workers, already on a 
defensive mode due the Hartz programme, were prepared to make wage concessions 
given that they anticipated poorer social protection in the case of any lengthy period 
of unemployment. Short-time working schemes and allowances represented a partial 
replacement of wages for hours not worked, funded through unemployment insur-
ance. They mainly developed in the industrial sector and essentially concerned men 
(Knuth, 2014). The reference to the male (main) breadwinner has thereby been rein-
forced in the income maintenance system (Eydoux, 2014). In Spain, on the other hand, 
the growth since 2008 of the number of households with only the mother employed 
seems to challenge the male breadwinner model (Escobedoa and Wall, 2015). This 
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could be explained by the very strong ‘added worker’ effect for women in Spain that 
Galvez-Munoz et al. (2014) find in their estimation of the labour supply of couple 
households in Italy and Spain. In Italy, however, despite increased female labour force 
participation since 2011 in response to the reduction in household income, unfavour-
able work opportunities (especially in the disadvantaged south) discouraged many 
women from looking for a job.
All these considerations indicate that fiscal consolidation plans might have signifi-
cantly weakened the position of women on many levels, by reducing their economic 
independence, and by imposing heavier family workloads and more labour supply 
constraints. The resulting reduced effort, availability, flexibility and continuity that 
women are presumably able to offer in the labour market could have fed a downward 
adjustment in employers’ expectations with regards to women’s productivity levels. 
Together with the consequent expectations of higher variability in women’s product-
ivity, and in conditions of incomplete information on the characteristics of individual 
workers, the scope for ‘statistical’ labour market discrimination (Phelps, 1972) might 
have increased. In the absence of perfect information on individuals, employers, rely-
ing on average group characteristics, react to the expected higher variability and lower 
levels of women’s productivity by paying lower wages or limiting their access to high-
paying jobs (which normally require more flexibility, continuity and effort). From this 
perspective, austerity episodes might have the potential to become significant turning 
points in gender relations, employment and welfare states. This could be particularly 
the case in countries where the move away from traditional patriarchal family struc-
tures towards a dual earner model is more recent, and where social norms and atti-
tudes towards women’s role in the family and economy are not sufficiently established 
to resist cyclical policy changes (Rubery, 2014, p. 23).
3. Gender wage gap in the EU: data, variables and preliminary descriptive 
evidence
3.1 Data and variables
Our empirical analysis relies on the European Union Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) with reference years from 2010 to 2013. The units of observa-
tions are individuals aged between 16 and 65 years who are employed as dependent 
workers. Individuals not in employment, in education, self-employed or retired are 
used in the empirical analyses to account and correct for sample selection bias (see 
below).
The wage variable (PY010G in the dataset) is defined as the gross total (yearly) 
remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for 
work done in the reference period. It includes wages and salaries paid in cash, holiday 
payments, 13th-month and overtime payment, profit-sharing, bonuses and product-
ivity premia, allowances paid for transport or for working in remote locations, and the 
social contributions and income taxes payable by employees. The use of gross wages is 
common in the literature that considers within-country wage and earnings inequality 
(Antonczyk et al., 2010) and employs EU-SILC data (Brandolini et al., 2010). In order 
to account for differences in hours worked, we computed all earning measures on an 
hourly basis using the information on the number of hours usually worked per week 
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in the main job and the number of months spent at work.1 The top and bottom 1% of 
the hourly wage distributions in each country and year were trimmed in order to avoid 
distortion by outliers. All monetary values are expressed in 2015 Euro PPPs.2
As explanatory variables of wages, besides the gender of the worker, we use a large 
set of individual information, which includes education, employment status (tem-
porary or permanent), age (and its square), marital status, self-reported health sta-
tus, place of residence (urban/non-urban region), presence of a second job, full-time 
employment, type of occupation, and sector and size of the firm in which the individ-
ual is employed (see Table A1 for a detailed description of all variables and acronyms 
used in the analysis). Although extensive, the available information on individual and 
job characteristics is not exhaustive. Some wage drivers that are likely to differ across 
genders, such as job tenure and seniority (Munasinghe et al., 2008)3 or degree sub-
ject (Machin and Puhani, 2003) are not accounted for. Such issues, to the extent that 
the missing information is not correlated with other available variables, can poten-
tially impact on the estimated gender gap, although some evidence suggests that the 
distortion is limited (Perugini, 2017). However, our focus here is not estimation of 
the gender gap but the impact of austerity on gender inequality, and such issues are 
unlikely to bias the austerity coefficient estimates (see Sections 5 and 6 for details of 
the empirical model).
3.2 The gender wage gap and its components
The descriptive analysis on gender wage gap levels and trends presented here is based 
on a standard twofold Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). 
The decomposition splits the difference in the average (log) hourly wages between 
men and women (the unadjusted gender wage gap)4 into explained and unexplained 
parts (Jann, 2008):
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1 We used the EU-SILC variables PL060 (number of hours usually worked per week in main job) and 
PL073/74 (number of months spent at work as employee). The only assumption needed to compute the 
total number of hours worked per year is that all employed individuals work four weeks per month.
2 Despite the efforts made in the EU-SILC to harmonise data, country-level differences in the way wage 
information is collected and in payment methods persist. However, such issues have a very limited effect on 
our analysis because we are not comparing absolute wage levels across countries but (relative) wage gaps, 
and how information is collected and processed within each country does not differ across genders. In addi-
tion, in all our empirical analysis, we make use of country fixed effects, which control for all country-level 
unobserved differences.
3 Unfortunately, the EU-SILC variable describing work experience (PL200—number of years spent in 
paid work) presents many missing values (about 27% of our sample of employees). Missing information is 
also strongly concentrated in some countries: Denmark (completely missing), Bulgaria, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovenia. The use of the variable would have, therefore, 
meant excluding those countries from the analysis. The variable ‘age’ can be considered a good proxy for 
experience, since their correlation for the available observations is statistically significant and ranges from 
0.55 to 0.70 in the four years considered.
4 Log transformations are usual in the analysis of wages, as they usually have asymmetric distribution and 
need to be transformed in order to perform parametric estimations. Additionally, the difference in log wages 
is approximately equal to the percentage difference between the groups (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, 
p. 86), which enables easier interpretation of results.
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where yF  and yM  are female and male log wages; Xk
F  and Xk
M  are the vectors of 
average female and male workers’ and job characteristics; θk
F  and θk
M  are the returns 
to these characteristics from the two earnings equations; and ˆ*θk  is the vector of refer-
ence coefficients (returns), introduced to estimate the explained and the unexplained 
parts independently from the group viewpoint (Jann, 2008; Avlijaš et al., 2013). We fol-
low Jann (2008) in using the coefficients from the pooled model for both genders (with 
gender included as a covariate) as the reference coefficients for the decomposition.
The decomposition is estimated on the pooled dataset for the EU-28 countries for 
all four years (controlling for country and time effects), as well as for each year sep-
arately (controlling for country effects) (see Table A2). We perform the same analysis 
at country level and present the levels of the adjusted wage gap in Table A3. Besides 
gender, we control for previously listed covariates and sample selection effects, as the 
selection of employees from the sample of working-age individuals could be non-
random and therefore produce biases in the estimation of the coefficients from the 
wage equations. In the field of gender studies, a growing literature has recognised that 
employed women tend more often to have characteristics normally associated with 
high wages (Heckman, 1979; De la Rica et al., 2008). As a consequence, low female 
employment rates may become consistent with a low gender wage gap simply because 
low-wage women do not feature in the observed wage distribution. To account for 
the selection effects, we use a correction based on the Heckman two-stage method 
(Heckman, 1979). First-stage participation equations, in which the dependent vari-
able is coded as 1 if the individual is employed as a dependent worker and 0 otherwise 
(i.e. self-employed, unemployed, in education, fulfilling domestic tasks, retired, other 
inactivity status), are estimated separately for each country, year and gender. This first 
step regressions include a total of 1,304,520 individuals, of which 677,902 belong 
to the first group (dependent workers) and the remaining 628,818 to the second. In 
addition to the already described personal characteristics, we add variables related to 
household structure that we were able to build based on information available in the 
EU-SILC. They refer to household size and the number of children (less than 3, 4–6, 
7–15 years old) and elderly (65–74, over 75 years old). Generally speaking, results are 
consistent with ex-ante expectations: the probability of being employed as a dependent 
worker increases with age (non-linearly), for married individuals, in urban areas, and 
with higher education levels. Poor health conditions, larger families and the presence 
of children or elderlies play the opposite role. Full tables of results for specific genders, 
countries and years are available upon request. Based on the estimates from the probit 
equations, we compute a fitted values of an index function and use ratio of the prob-
ability density function to the cumulative distribution function of the index function 
to compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) (Wooldridge, 2002). The IMR and its square 
are then added to the list of covariates in the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition (equation 
1), as well as later in estimating the effects of austerity on gender equality.
The difference in log hourly wages between the genders, which equals the unadjusted 
gender wage gap, is estimated at 13.6% and was relatively stable between 2010 and 
2013 (Table A2); the same holds for the majority of countries.5 The negative coefficient 
5 Detailed results of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition country by country are not reported here but are 
available upon request.
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for the explained part of the gap in Table A2 (−0.027) indicates that the raw gender 
wage differences cannot be explained by men’s better characteristics. According to the 
available information, on average, women have better characteristics than men, so the 
adjusted gender wage gap is higher than the unadjusted one and estimated at 16.3%. 
Similarly to the trends for the unadjusted gap, the explained part and the adjusted wage 
gap (both overall and by country) vary very little over time (Figure 1 and Table A3). In 
most Central and Eastern European economies (Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, 
Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria and to a lesser extent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) 
but also in Portugal and Denmark, the explained part is negative, signalling better la-
bour market characteristics for women. On the other hand, in most Western economies 
(Germany, Austria, UK, France, the Netherlands and Finland), the explained part is 
positive, indicating that men have better labour market characteristics than women.
Both the explained and the unexplained part of the gap can be further disaggre-
gated into the contributions of individual predictors, as the total of each component 
is the sum of the individual contributions (Jann, 2008). This piece of information 
is reported in the bottom part of Table A2. It reveals that the negative sign of the 
explained part of the gap is the result of two groups of factors with opposing effects. 
2010 2013
Note: Our elaboraons on EU -SILC data; for the country acronyms see Table A3 in the Appendix
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Fig. 1. Explained and unexplained gender wage gap in EU-28 countries (2010 and 2013).
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The first one includes the labour market characteristics that are in favour of women. 
They, on average, work in better-paid occupations, have higher levels of education and 
are on average older then employed men. The second group of factors consists of the 
characteristics that describe male advantages in the labour market. Men, on average, 
work in better-paid sectors, more frequently in larger companies and are employed 
more on permanent and full-time contracts. The main driver of this advantage for men 
is the fact that they work more frequently in better-paid sectors. This difference, ceteris 
paribus, explains 13% of the unadjusted wage gap (0.018 of 0.136, on average for all 
years) and increases significantly over time: from 10.3% (0.014 of 0.136) in 2010 to 
15.3% (0.021 of 0.137) in 2013, indicating that the impact of sectorial segregation on 
the gender wage gap became more pronounced.
4. Fiscal consolidation programmes in EU-28: data, measures and 
descriptive evidence
4.1 Data and indicators
The main aim of the paper is to assess the impact of fiscal consolidation programmes 
on gender wage inequality. To identify and quantify austerity measures, we adopt the 
conventional approach based on the use of the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB). Changes in CAPB have been extensively used in the literature to identify 
fiscal consolidation episodes; earlier studies (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997; 
Alesina et al., 1998) made use of the so-called Blanchard index (calculated assum-
ing unchanged unemployment rate with respect to the previous year). More recent 
contributions (e.g. Tsibouris et al., 2006; Molnar, 2012; Perivier, 2018; Campos et al., 
2017) prefer CAPB-based measures, acknowledging CAPB shortcomings which are 
primarily related to the fact that CAPB might reflect one-offs (Koen and van den 
Noord, 2005), growth surprises (Larch and Salto, 2005) and fluctuations on the rev-
enue side due to asset price dynamics (Girouard and Price, 2004). As explained by 
Gujardo et al. (2014), changes in cyclically adjusted fiscal variables might also incorp-
orate developments affecting total output that are not related to discretionary pol-
icy changes. In analyses aimed at identifying the expansionary/contractionary effects 
of fiscal consolidations, this poses a serious identification issue: a boom in the stock 
market, for example, not only improves the CAPB but is also likely to boost con-
sumption and investment, thereby downplaying the contractionary effects of fiscal 
consolidation. Similarly, the policy measure could be targeted at reducing the risk of 
overheating, posing a severe reverse causality issue. In order to overcome these short-
comings, the literature suggests an alternative approach, based on the identification 
of changes in fiscal policy direct from historical documents (e.g. Romer and Romer, 
2010; Devries et al., 2011; Gujardo et al., 2014, and the references cited therein). In 
our case, the large number of countries/years considered limits the feasibility of this 
narrative approach; at the same time, the focus of our study (impact of fiscal consoli-
dation on the gender wage gap rather than growth) lessens the importance of identifi-
cation and reverse causality issues. To address the remaining concerns (distortionary 
effects of cut-offs), in accordance with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) definition of ‘underlying primary balance’, we adjust the 
CAPB for the effects of one-off budget operations (typical examples are tax amnesties 
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or revenue from privatisations). Our source of data is the AMECO (2018) database, 
which provides EU countries with information on the structural (i.e. net of one-offs 
and temporary measures) balance of general government (excluding interest), with 
cyclical adjustment based on potential GDP excessive deficit procedure (see Mourre 
et al., 2003). Data for this measure of CAPB for the EU-28 countries is directly avail-
able on the AMECO website starting from 2010; for previous years, the datasets pro-
vide separated information on cyclically adjusted revenue and expenditure (excluding 
interest), but not on one-offs and temporary measures. However, since according to 
our conceptual framework, the effects of austerity measure on the gender wage gap 
might be lagged one or more years, we also need information on fiscal consolidations 
implemented prior to 2010 (see Section 5.3.1). We therefore reconstructed the CAPB 
change using the data on one-off measures derived from OECD (2018) to correct the 
cyclically adjusted revenue and expenditure data provided in AMECO for the years 
2006–09.
4.2 Fiscal consolidation and the gender wage gap in the EU-28: preliminary evidence
The geography of austerity in the years of the crisis in the EU-28 countries is illustrated 
in Table A4; the table describes the annual change of the CAPB over the period 2007–
13. Despite its limitations, the CAPB approach is able to provide a picture of austerity 
in Europe largely consistent with existing empirical evidence (e.g. Theodoropoulou and 
Watt, 2011; Addabbo et al., 2015; Rubery, 2015). Table A4 confirms that, starting from 
2009 but especially in the following years, most countries adopted fiscal consolidation 
measures. Particularly sharp reductions of government deficit were implemented in 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Czech Republic, Romania, Latvia and Slovenia. On 
the other hand, countries like Finland and Sweden did not introduce any fiscal adjust-
ments. The diagrams in Figure 2 report the cumulated change of the CAPB over three-
year periods, from 2007 to 2013. This measure, as opposed to the annual change, is 
able to provide a more illustrative picture of the implementation of fiscal adjustment; a 
reduction of government deficit in one year might indeed be compensated (and there-
fore its effects partially neutralised) by a surplus in the following years. A cumulative 
index therefore provides a more robust identification of austerity measures of a struc-
tural nature. The diagrams in Figure 2 clearly show how the situation evolved over the 
period considered, with a growing number of countries moving towards the implemen-
tation of more or less severe government balance consolidation plans.
Figure 3 provides a first snapshot of the existence of the relationship of interest to 
the paper. Each panel plots the relationship between the adjusted gender wage gap in 
year t and the cumulative change in CAPB from year t-1 to year t-3. As explained in de-
tail in Section 5.3, the use of lags for policy/institutional variables is a common practice 
in the literature and is motivated, among other things (e.g. potential risks of endogene-
ity), by the fact that the effects of policies/reforms are not immediate and take time to 
unfold. In all panels in Figure 3, a positive relation can be observed (as approximated 
by the regression line) between austerity and gender wage inequality, although the 
correlation coefficient is statistically significant in only two years (out of four). The 
relationship depicted in the diagrams is by its nature inconclusive, since besides the 
potential role of austerity, many country-level factors could impact the gender gap. For 
this reason, we have to undertake some methodological refinements, described in the 
following section. Nonetheless, the results displayed in Figure 3 corroborate the idea 
of austerity being associated with a deterioration in gender equality.
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5. Austerity and gender wage inequality
5.1 Baseline empirical framework
The starting point for the identification of the impact of austerity on the gender wage 
gap is the estimation of a wage equation, in which the log hourly wage (lhwage) is 
explained by a set of observable characteristics of the worker and of her/his employ-
ment position.
The microeconomic model of the wage determinants relies on the human capital 
approach as the theoretical basis for the earnings function (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 
1964). Higher wages are associated first of all with higher formal education attained 
and informal skills accumulated through longer working experience (both general or 
firm-/sector-specific). As explained in Section 3.1, while we have detailed information 
Fig. 2. Austerity plans in EU-28 countries, 2007–13 (three years’ cumulative CAPB changes).
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on education levels, we can only use the variable ‘age’ as a control for experience (as 
usual, included in linear and quadratic terms). The other explanatory variables refer 
and control for a large set of personal and job characteristics (see Section 3.1 and 
Table A1).
This wide range of information allows interpreting the gender dummy variable 
(female) as a proxy measure of the discrimination effect due to gender, once all remain-
ing (observable) characteristics are controlled for (Newell and Reilly, 2001; Perugini 
and Selezneva, 2015). This approach, as any other relying on a statistical residual, 
is exposed to the question of whether all the necessary independent variables were 
Fig. 3. Adjusted gender wage gap and austerity plans.
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included in the regression. If some factors are not measurable or not accountable for 
(say, job tenure) and, for example, men are better endowed than women with respect 
to those omitted variables, this would overestimate discrimination. Conversely, if some 
of the factors which are controlled for in such regressions, like occupation and indus-
try of employment, in themselves describe a form of discrimination, then the coeffi-
cient from the equation would  underestimate the discrimination.. However, as Blau 
and Kahn (2000) explain, results obtained using such approaches may nonetheless be 
instructive, if carefully interpreted in the awareness of the information included in the 
discrimination coefficient.
The baseline empirical model (for a pooled country/year sample) for the estimation 
of adjusted gender wage gap reads:
 lhwage Cons X femaleikt ikt ikt kt ikt= + + + +α β λ1 υ  (2)
where subscripts i, k and t denote individuals, countries and years, respectively; X is 
the regressor matrix and α the vector of associated coefficients. The coefficient of the 
gender dummy, β1, measures the adjusted gender wage gap; λkt denotes country-by-
year dummies and υ is a mean-zero error term. The presence of distinct country–year 
intercepts addresses the issue related to the multilevel data structure, in which indi-
vidual observations are nested within the country level (see Bryan and Jenkins, 2013).
5.2 Differences-in-differences approach
5.2.1 Methods and empirical models. To estimate the impact of austerity measures on 
the adjusted gender wage gap, we rely in the first instance on the differences-in-differ-
ences approach, that is specifically designed and extensively used for impact evaluation 
analysis. The intuition behind this approach is to compare the changes in the outcome 
over time of the group that was treated with some programme or policy—the treat-
ment group (TG)—and the group that was not—the control group (CG). By making 
use of the same observations in two time periods (longitudinal data), the difference in 
the gender pay gap is free from the bias caused by gender differences in observed or 
unobserved characteristics.
For the implementation of this part of the analysis, we rely on the longitudinal ver-
sion of the EU-SILC database, which is a four years rotational panel, with reference 
years 2010–13 (EU-SILC Longitudinal UDB 2014 – revision 2 of March 2017). By 
its own nature (rotational design and attrition), the use of the longitudinal dataset 
limits the number of observations to those available in both the initial (2010) and the 
final year (2013) of the period considered. In addition, not all variables provided in the 
EU-SILC cross-section sample are available in the panel dataset: in our case, we could 
not include the sector of employment, the size of the employer and the information 
about part-time/full-time jobs.
As for the country coverage of the analysis, the formation of the two groups (TG 
and CG) implied excluding some countries (besides Germany and Croatia, which 
are not included in the EU-SILC longitudinal dataset). The assumptions behind the 
method’s identification approach demand first of all that all countries belonging to the 
two groups were not exposed to a treatment (in our case, sizable austerity measures) 
that could have shaped their gender wage gap observed in the initial year (2010 in 
our case). As a result, based on the data in Table A4, we excluded Estonia, Hungary, 
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Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, Cyprus and Italy. Based on the same informa-
tion, we then identified the CG countries as those that did not implement austerity 
measures in the period 2010–12. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Poland 
belong to this group (CG). Another crucial condition for identification is that the 
countries included in the two groups experienced a similar trend in the variable of 
interest before the beginning of the period of analysis. According to the data provided 
by Eurostat,6 in all our CG countries (with the partial exception of Belgium), the gen-
der wage gap declined in the period 2006–10; the EU countries with a similar trend 
and which implemented austerity programmes between 2010 and 2012 (our TG) are 
the Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal.
Based on Angrist and Pischke (2009), we adapt the differences-in-differences 
approach for our purpose, in which the variable on which the effect of the treatment is 
assessed is not a wage level (as in the case of the reference work by Card and Krueger, 
1994) but a wage gap. Our empirical model therefore reads:
 lhwage Cons X female female T femalikt ikt ikt ikt= + + + +α β β β1 2 2013 3
. e TG
female T TG
ikt k
iky k kt ikt
.
. . υ+ + +β λ4 2013
 
(3)
where T2013  is a time dummy variable for the final year (2013) and TG is a dummy vari-
able (at country level) which identifies the treated group (i.e. countries in which an aus-
terity plan was implemented between 2010 and 2012). In such a model, following Angrist 
and Pischke (2009), β1  is the gender wage gap in the CG countries in 2010; β2  is the 
change in the gender wage gap for the CG between 2010 and 2013; β3  is the difference in 
gender wage gap in 2010 between the TG and the CG; and β4  is the difference between 
the TG and the CG in the gender wage gap change between 2010 and 2013 and therefore 
the differences-in-differences coefficient that identifies the effect of the treatment.
An important empirical aspect that needs to be carefully addressed, already men-
tioned and dealt with in Section 3.2, refers to the possible estimation bias due to 
sample selection. All our empirical models are therefore estimated using a Heckman 
(1979) correction, as done for the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition.
5.2.2 Results. The results of the estimation of equation (3) are reported in Table 1. 
Column 1 reports the baseline estimation in which the TG is composed of the Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Spain and Greece and the CG comprises Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and Poland. Columns 2 and 3 show how outcomes are robust to mar-
ginal alterations in the two groups. The estimates in column 2 exclude Belgium from 
the CG, since it had a slightly different gender wage gap trend prior to 2010 compared 
to the remaining countries. In column 3, the TG is augmented with Portugal, which 
had a slightly increasing trend (as opposed to a decreasing one).
In all estimations, the differences-in-differences term β4  is negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that in the countries in which austerity plans were imple-
mented, the gender wage gap increased significantly, while in the  CG countries such a 
change did not occur (β3  is positive but not statistically significant).
The estimated coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables indicate, as 
expected, that wages increase with age, education and better health conditions; 
6 Table [tsdsc340]—gender pay gap in unadjusted form, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
products-datasets/-/SDG_05_20 (last accessed 19/10/2018).
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remunerations are also higher in urban areas and for permanent positions. The controls 
for occupations provide the expected hierarchy of coefficients (not reported for the 
sake of brevity, but available upon request).
The results of the impact of austerity are confirmed if we look at the changes in the 
adjusted gender wage gap over time (from 2010 to 2013) within the two groups sep-
arately (Table A5). In all estimations, the gender gap increases in 2013 compared to 
2010 for the TG, contrary to what happened for the CG, in which the change over the 
four years is not statistically significant.
5.3 Country fixed-effects model
The differences-in-differences approach allows only a limited coverage of the analysis 
due to data constraints, in terms of both individuals and countries. In this section, we 
use an alternative empirical strategy that, despite sub-optimal for the purpose of the 
Table 1. Austerity and gender wage gap, differences-in-differences estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.181*** −0.166*** −0.173***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Female*year 2013 0.039* 0.028 0.028
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Female*TG 0.024 0.020 0.016
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Female*TG*year 2013 −0.081** −0.071** −0.066**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032)
Married −0.012 −0.010 −0.017*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Age 0.123** 0.011 0.066
(0.048) (0.050) (0.048)
Age2 −0.001 0.011* 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Health status −0.013** −0.001 −0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Secondary education 0.046** 0.041* 0.076***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020)
Tertiary education 0.056** 0.040 0.078***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
Permanent 0.458*** 0.450*** 0.441***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Urban 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 1.391*** 1.593*** 1.534***
(0.108) (0.112) (0.108)
Observations 18,527 17,435 19,206
Adjusted R2 0.422 0.412 0.418
Notes: All estimations include country/year and occupation dummies; sample selection correction. 
Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for variable and acronym descriptions. The coefficient of 
‘Female*TG*year 2013’ measures: [(AGWG13 − AGWG10)TG − (AGWG13 − AGWG10)CG]. Columns: (1) 
treatment group: CZ, IE, ES, EL; control group: BE, DK, FI, SE, PL. (2) treatment group: CZ, IE, ES, 
EL; control group: DK, FI, SE, PL. (3) treatment group: CZ, IE, ES, EL, PT; control group: BE, DK, FI, 
SE, PL.
Significance at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level.
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analysis, allows extending the empirical analysis to all EU-28 countries. This is also 
functional to test whether the main conclusion reached (austerity increasing gender 
wage inequality) is robust to a different method and sample.
5.3.1 Methods and empirical models. In the simplest, baseline empirical pooled model 
described in equation (2), the individual effects are constrained to be equal across 
countries but they can be allowed to differ by interacting subsets of individual-level 
characteristics with the country dummies. The use of country fixed effects obvi-
ously prevents the inclusion of additional country-level predictors in the empirical 
model, since the country intercepts already fully encapsulate cross-country differences 
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999). However, as done for example in Perugini and Selezneva 
(2015), country-level variables can be interacted with individual-level variables so as to 
obtain the additional effect that a country-level factor produces on the main (individ-
ual-level) effect. In our case, the interaction of country-level austerity indicators (AUS) 
with the gender dummy allows estimating the impact of austerity on the gender gap. 
Equation (4) describes this augmented empirical model, which can be estimated on 
the EU-28 sample obtained by pooling the county/year cross-sections (28 countries, 
4 years):
 lhwage Cons X female female AUSikt ikt ikt ikt kt kt ik= + + + +α β β λ1 2 . + υ t  (4)
where all variable and parameters correspond to those described for equation (2) and 
the coefficient β2  measures the impact of austerity on the adjusted gender gap.
As customary in the literature (Bassanini et al., 2009; Bourlès et al., 2012), the pol-
icy/institutional variables (AUS in our case) are lagged in order to alleviate endogene-
ity issues and to account for the fact that the implementation of policies/reforms take 
time to become effective. In order to test the robustness of our results, we use various 
measures and lags (see Table A1 for their definition).
We first of all estimate equation (4) using as austerity indicator the annual CAPB 
change, lagged either one (AUS_L1), two (AUS_L2) or three years (AUS_L3). Hence, 
for example in the case of one-year lag, for the data referring to 2010, the relevant aus-
terity measure is the CAPB change in 2009; for the data referring to 2011, the CAPB 
change in 2010, and so on. In order to test whether a threshold effect exists (i.e. only 
changes large enough are able to produce visible effects), we also estimate equation 
(4) using as AUS a dummy variable (AUS_d) that is 1 if the annual change in CAPB 
exceeds 0.5% and 0 otherwise. Robustness checks are run for different thresholds 
(CAPB change >0 or >1%). Following Alesina et al. (2015), we also distinguish meas-
ures prevalently based on expenditure cuts or tax hikes. This is done by decomposing 
the CAPB dummy variable into two dummies (TB_AUS_d and EB_AUS_d) that indi-
cate whether the consolidation plan was (predominantly) tax-based (TB) or expendi-
ture-based (EB). For each AUS_d = 1, TB_AUS_d was coded as 1 if the change in the 
cyclically adjusted structural revenues (as a % of GDP) was higher than the change in 
the cyclically adjusted structural expenditures, and coded as 0 otherwise. EB_AUS_d 
was coded as 1 when TB_AUS_d equals 0 and as 0 when TB_AUS_d equals 1. Lastly, 
we test for the possibility that fiscal consolidation/austerity plans (rather than one-year 
measures) could better describe the impact of austerity on the gender wage gap. We 
therefore build a cumulated CAPB variable (AUS_p – austerity plan) which, for the 
year t, is obtained as the sum of the CAPB change in years t-1, t-2 and t-3 (variable 
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named AUS_p_3_L1). This captures the idea that the gender wage gap in 2010 is 
affected by the austerity measures implemented in the period 2007–09; the gender 
wage gap in 2011 by the austerity plan in 2008–10, and so on. As a robustness check, 
we use a similar variable but cumulating two years only (AUS_p_2_L1). As done for 
the annual CAPB changes, we transformed these variables into dummies, coding 
them as 1 if the cumulated CAPB exceeded 1% and 0 otherwise (AUS_p_3_d_L1 
and AUS_p_2_d_L1). Robustness checks were run for different thresholds (cumulated 
CAPB >0.5% and >1.5%). Again, we tested for the possible heterogeneous effects of 
austerity plans, constructing the two corresponding dummy variables (TB_AUS_p_d 
and EB_AUS_p_d).
5.3.2 Results. Tables 2, 3 and A6 report the estimates of the model described in equa-
tion (4); although not displayed, all models include sector and occupation dummies as 
well as country/year fixed effects. All models include the sample selection correction 
and are estimated pooling the 28 EU countries and the four years (2010 -13).
The baseline estimation in column 1 in Table 2 shows that the average (adjusted) 
gender wage gap in the pooled sample is 16.3%, which corresponds to the figure 
reported in the first column of Table A2 (the unexplained part of the gender wage 
gap). The coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables confirm the results 
presented in Table 1; the additional variables (available for the cross-section sample 
only) also provide interesting insights. Sector dummies (not reported in the tables 
but available upon request) are significant and consistent with wage differentials nor-
mally observed across industries; also, hourly wages are higher in larger firms and for 
part-time positions. This latter outcome might be due to the fact that in part-time jobs 
the monthly wage reduction is not proportional to the reduction in hours worked. As 
a consequence, on an hourly basis, part-time positions might be better remunerated. 
However, this interpretation is in contrast to the literature on productivity/wage pen-
alties for part-time workers and the descriptive evidence from our sample, in which 
the raw difference between full-time and part-time positions is positive for the large 
majority of countries. It is, therefore, more likely that our result can be explained in 
view of the empirical evidence showing that the part/full-time wage difference tends 
to disappear once the effects of self-selection into different segments of the labour 
market and personal and job characteristics are controlled for (e.g. Rodgers, 2004).7 
Our results also show that hourly wage declines both as health status deteriorates and 
for workers with a second job. The controls for occupation and sector provide the 
expected hierarchy of coefficients (not reported for the sake of brevity, but available 
upon request).
As far as the focus of our analysis is concerned, columns 2–4 of Table 2 show that 
austerity measures implemented in years t-1, t-2 and t-3, respectively, exacerbate 
gender wage inequality, with increasing momentum as time proceeds. For example, 
a 1% increase in CAPB in year t-3 (AUS_L3) increases the gender wage gap by 
7 As expected, part-time positions are more common for women and in certain sectors, such as hotels 
and restaurants and health and social services. When all these variables are included in the regressions, the 
full-time dummy captures the difference with part-time within each individual characteristics profile. It is, 
for example, sufficient to exclude the gender variable from the regression to obtain a positive and significant 
coefficient for the full-time variable. At the same time, the exclusion of the full-time dummy from the model 
only very marginally affects the results, especially those of interest here [the coefficient of ‘female’ in column 
1 of Table 2 declines by 0.05%]. Detailed results are available upon request.
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0.4% in year t. A similar detrimental (and statistically significant) effect on gender 
equality is played by austerity plans (2/3 years cumulated CAPB changes lagged one 
year, columns 5 and 6). As a first robustness check, but also in order to investigate 
the possibility that a dichotomic measure of austerity might provide clearer results, 
Table 2. Austerity and gender wage gap (yearly and cumulative CAPB changes), country fixed-
effect estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female −0.163*** −0.162*** −0.164*** −0.166*** −0.163*** −0.164***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female*AUS_L1 −0.001***
(0.001)
Female*AUS_L2 −0.003***
(0.001)
Female*AUS_L3 −0.004***
(0.001)
Female* AUS_p_2_L1 −0.001***
(0.000)
Female*AUS_p_3_L1 −0.001***
(0.000)
Married 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.224*** 0.219*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.223***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 −0.018*** −0.017*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Health status −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Secondary education 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tertiary education 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.216***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Full time −0.037*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.037*** −0.036*** −0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Second job −0.028*** −0.029*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Permanent 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm size (11–49) 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm size (over 50) 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.925*** 1.937*** 1.491*** 1.918*** 1.924*** 1.921***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.695 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696
Notes: All estimations include sector, occupation and country/year dummies; sample selection correction. 
Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for variable and acronym descriptions.
Significance at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level.
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in Table 3 we replace the continuous measures of CAPB changes with the dummy 
variables AUS_d and AUS_p_d described in Section 5.3.1 (see also Table A1 for the 
definition of variables and acronyms). Results are in line with those shown in Table 2, 
that is, austerity increases the gender gap, but the size of the effect is remarkably 
larger, especially when austerity is identified as a multi-annual consolidation plan. 
Table 3. Austerity measures and gender wage gap (yearly and cumulative CAPB changes as a 
dummy variable), country fixed-effect estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female −0.159*** −0.158*** −0.162*** −0.159*** −0.156***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female*AUS_d_L1 −0.008***
(0.002)
Female*AUS_d_L2 −0.018***
(0.002)
Female*AUS_d_L3 −0.008***
(0.002)
Female* AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.014***
(0.002)
Female*AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.027***
(0.002)
Married 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.224***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Health status −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Secondary education 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tertiary education 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Full time −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Second job −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Permanent 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm size (11–49) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm size (over 50) 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.923*** 1.921*** 1.924*** 1.921*** 1.920***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696
Notes: All estimations include sector, occupation and country/year dummies; sample selection correction. 
Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for variable and acronym descriptions.
Significance at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level.
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A cumulative CAPB change larger than 1% in the preceding two (AUS_p_2_d_L1) 
and three (AUS_p_3_d_L1) years increases the gender wage gap by 1.4% and 2.7%, 
respectively. This evidence not only supports the view that austerity exacerbates 
gender gap inequality, but also indicates that sizable austerity plans are able to exert 
a conspicuous and increasing effect over time. Robustness checks carried out alter-
ing the threshold of the dummy variables (AUS_d > 0% and AUS_d > 1% for the 
annual CAPB change; AUS_p_d > 0.5% and AUS_p_d > 1.5% for the cumulated 
CAPB change) confirm the outcomes shown in Table 3 (not reported here but avail-
able upon request).
In order to investigate whether there is a difference between the impacts of tax-based 
and expenditure-based austerity plans on gender wage gap, in Table A6, we replace 
the dummies used in Table 3 with those calculated separately for tax and expenditure 
changes (TB_AUS_p_d and EB_AUS_p_d). Outcomes confirm the detrimental role 
of austerity on gender equality (therefore confirming the robustness of our findings) 
and indicate that the effect of expenditure cuts tends to be larger than that of tax hikes, 
although their difference is statistically significant in only one case.
6. Austerity and gender segregation
6.1 Methods and empirical models
In order to investigate whether austerity measures impact on the horizontal dimension 
of gender inequality, we also estimated the relationship between fiscal consolidation 
and the probability of women being employed in sectors with different average wage 
levels. Our choice of sectors as a dimension of gender segregation is dictated by the fact 
that industries better reflect dynamics of horizontal segregation, occupations being at 
least partly the result of decisions related to education, personal characteristics and 
skills (rather than of a sectorial choice). In addition, as emerged in the Blinder–Oaxaca 
decomposition presented in Section 3.2, gender asymmetries in occupations do not 
explain the gender wage gap. On the contrary, sectorial segregation explains on average 
13% of the wage gap, since men disproportionately work in better-paid sectors. From 
2010 to 2013, this share grew from 10% to 15% (see Section 3.2), which indicates that 
this dimension of gender inequality tends to be increasingly important.
Unfortunately, the unavailability of the information about sectors of employment 
in the longitudinal EU-SILC dataset prevents the implementation of a differences-in-
differences approach similar to the one described in Section 5.2. Therefore, we rely 
again on a country fixed-effect model as in Section 5.3, applied on the pooled EU-28 
sample.
To this end, as a preliminary step, we re-ranked the 13 sectors from the lowest to the 
highest average pay in each country/year. The 13 ordered sectors were rearranged into 
5 ordered categories so as to have a balanced number of individuals.8 This ordered var-
iable—sector(v), ranging from 1 to 5—is then used to estimate the following ordered 
logit model:
 Sec tor( ) . .v ikt ikt ikt ikt kt k t kX female female AUS u u= + + + + +α β β λ1 2 λt ikt+ υ  (5)
8 Robustness checks were run reducing the number of ordered categories to 3 or keeping the 13 original 
sectors.
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where symbols and variables correspond to those described in equation (2). However, 
since the variables related to job positions (occupations, second job, part time, per-
manent employment, size of the firm) are to some extent a consequence of being 
employed in a given sector, we also run the same model excluding them from the set 
X in order to check the robustness of our results. As explained in Cameron and Trivedi 
(2010), the signs of the regression parameters in equation (5) can be immediately 
interpreted as determining whether the latent dependent variable increases with the 
regressor. A positive coefficient indicates that the associated regressor decreases the 
probability of belonging to the lowest category (lowest pay sectors) and increases the 
probability of belonging to the highest category (highest pay sectors).
6.2 Results
Results of the estimation of equation (5) are reported in Table 4 (and Table A7) and 
confirm that women have a lower probability of being employed in high-paying sec-
tors; in addition, they clearly suggest that the implementation of fiscal consolidation 
measures leads to a further decline in female workers’ chances of being employed in 
better-paid sectors. If we distinguish the nature of austerity measures/plans (columns 
3 and 4 of Table 4), the expenditure-based ones seem to exert a more detrimental role 
on gender wage inequality, via sectorial employment segregation adverse to women. 
This outcome is soundly confirmed by the evidence presented in Table A7, which dif-
fers from Table 4 in the exclusion of job-related control variables that might have cap-
tured some sectorial aspects. Further robustness checks were carried out, reducing the 
number of ordered sectors to 3 and increasing it to 13. Results, not displayed here but 
available upon request, unequivocally confirm that austerity further reduces women’s 
chances of being employed in high-paid sectors.
7. Discussion and final remarks
The aim of this study is to provide evidence on the relationship between the implemen-
tation of austerity measures and gender inequality. While the existing literature offers 
a number of theoretical explanations as to how fiscal consolidation policies impact 
asymmetrically on women, empirical evidence not limited to pure descriptive methods 
is still very scanty. Moreover, many studies focus on the effect of fiscal contractionary 
policies on quantitative labour market aspects such as female employment, unemploy-
ment and activity rates, whereas their consequences for gender wage discrimination 
and horizontal segregation remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we tried to fill 
this gap by means of an empirical analysis employing EU-SILC microdata for the EU 
member states in the period 2010–13.
Our findings support, on different fronts, the idea that austerity is detrimental to 
gender equality. The first empirical evidence we provide is the existence of a positive 
relationship between the implementation of austerity measures and gender wage in-
equality when accounting for a wide (although not exhaustive) set of workers and jobs 
characteristics: in other words, austerity favours gender discrimination practices. We 
explain this result in the more general framework of statistical discrimination, rather 
than as related to the discriminatory tastes of employees, co-workers or customers 
(Becker, 1957). Statistical discrimination arises in the context of incomplete informa-
tion, when employers, in the absence of information on individual counterparts, use 
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Table 4. Austerity plans and sectoral gender segregation, country fixed-effect estimation
Dependent variable: sectors 
ordered by increasing average 
wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.015** −0.013** −0.015** −0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Female*p_AUS_2_d_L1 −0.114***
(0.009)
Female*p_AUS_3_d_L1 −0.144***
(0.010)
Female*EB_AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.177***
(0.014)
Female*TB_AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.076***
(0.011)
Female*EB_AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.162***
(0.018)
Female*TB_AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.137***
(0.011)
Married 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.561*** 0.559*** 0.561*** 0.559***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age2 −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.054***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Health status 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Secondary education 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.274***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Tertiary education 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.543***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Full time 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.073***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Second job −0.155*** −0.155*** −0.155*** −0.154***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Permanent −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm size (11–49) 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.473***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm size (over 50) 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.744***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Urban −0.037*** −0.037*** −0.037*** −0.037***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cut 1 1.137*** 1.135*** 1.137*** 1.135***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Cut 2 2.156*** 2.154*** 2.156*** 2.154***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Cut 3 3.189*** 3.188*** 3.190*** 3.188***
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070)
Cut 4 4.752*** 4.751*** 4.753*** 4.751***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Test (χ2) EB_AUS = TB_AUS 41.41*** 1.59
Observations 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702
Pseudo-R2 0.0719 0.0719 0.0719 0.0719
Notes: All estimations include sector, occupation and country/year dummies; sample selection correction. 
Columns 2 and 4 also include occupation dummies. Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for variable 
and acronym descriptions.
Significance at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level.
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group averages to predict the skill and productivity of individuals in a group (Phelps, 
1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977). This leads to the ‘rational’ response of paying lower 
wages to individuals belonging to the more heterogeneous group with lower expected 
productivity. In our conceptual framework, austerity measures might have driven 
downwards employers’ expectations of women’s productivity. The extensive budget 
cuts to care services, described in Section 2, likely fed an expectation of lower avail-
ability, continuity and flexibility of female labour. Similarly, heavier family care loads 
(of children and the elderly), typically heaped disproportionately on women, probably 
decreased their ability to provide the expected level of effort on the job. Also, aus-
terity measures often took the form of pension cuts, limited or frozen access to early 
retirement, and postponement of retirement age, all measures that are likely to have 
aggravated women’s family workload by reducing their reliance on grandparents for 
childcare. Some measures introduced right at the end of our period of examination, 
such as the universal tax credit in UK, and intended to replace six different benefits, 
might contribute to decreasing labour market incentives for second earners in couples, 
most of them being women. As Adam and Browne (2013) show, the introduction of 
universal credit strengthens the incentive for couples to have one person in work rather 
than none, but weakens the incentive for both members of a couple to work.
Besides impacting directly on the pay that female workers are able to negotiate vis-à-
vis the employer, these mechanisms might explain the exacerbation of horizontal seg-
regation that emerged in our analysis. Our second main result is indeed that austerity 
reduced the already low probability of women (compared to men) of being employed 
in high-paying sectors. This indicates a deterioration of women’s capacity to attain 
high-paid job positions in general, on which the imposition of heavier family-related 
tasks poses relevant constraints. Jobs in high-paying sectors normally imply high flexi-
bility and adaptability (time- and space-wise), and also long-term continuity on the job 
in order to accumulate the specific experience that complements formal education (see 
Perugini and Pompei, 2017). The inability of women to supply such assets in a context 
of decreasing provision of family care services may seriously impact their capacity to 
compete with men in attaining such jobs.
The third important piece of evidence we have obtained is that austerity impacts 
negatively on gender equality not only when it is based on expenditure cuts but also 
when it is based on tax hikes (although the effect tends to be quantitatively weaker). 
Higher taxation inevitably translates into lower individual and household disposable 
income. In a context of gender wage inequality and widespread budget cuts that gen-
erate an increasing need for unpaid family work, a reduction in household disposable 
income is likely to lead to a reinforcement of the male breadwinner model. The re-
duction of household disposable income might indeed drive division of labour within 
the family in favour of the breadwinner (most frequently the man) doing mostly paid 
work, with family care tasks becoming the responsibility of the lower-income recipient 
(normally the woman). These mechanisms might reinforce the patterns that feed the 
already described weaknesses in women’s bargaining power and job positions.
Our study is one of the first attempts to provide quantitative evidence of the effects 
of austerity on gender wage inequality. A priority on our research agenda is to update 
the analysis as soon as microdata for the most recent years are available. Our results 
clearly show that the effects of fiscal consolidation on the gender gap take time to fully 
unfold; since the bulk of austerity measures were implemented in Europe after 2011, 
this means that further bad news is still to come. The implications of our results, if 
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confirmed, will not be small. The ideology on which the desirability of austerity is 
based will, at the very least, need to add to the list of its side effects the worsening of 
one of the most unacceptable forms of inequality: that based on gender. Similarly, for 
European policymakers wishing to promote development patterns that are concerned 
with equity, the evidence presented here suggests that public budget balance consoli-
dation has various consequences for gender inequality, which put at risk the little pro-
gress achieved to date.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of variables and abbreviations used in the text and in the tables
Acronym Definition
lhwage Log of hourly wage
Female Gender dummy (female = 1)
Married Marital status dummy (married = 1)
Age Number of years
Health status Self-reported health status (from 1 – very good to 5 – very bad)
Education Highest level of education attained (1 = primary education; 
2 = secondary education; 3 = tertiary education)
Primary education Primary education dummy (ISCED levels 0–2 = 1)
Secondary education Secondary education dummy (ISCED levels 3–4 = 1)
Tertiary education Tertiary education dummy (ISCED levels 5–6 = 1)
Full time Full-time/part-time dummy (full time = 1)
Second job Second job dummy (second job = 1)
Permanent Employment status dummy (permanent = 1)
Firm size Size of the employer (coded as 1 if between 0 and 10 employed; 2 
between 11 and 49; 3 if over 50)
Firm size (0–10) Small firm size dummy (between 0 and 10 employed = 1)
Firm size (11–49) Medium firm size dummy (between 11 and 49 employed = 1)
Firm size (over 50) Large firm size dummy (over 50 employed = 1)
Urban Place of residence dummy (urban = 1)
Occupation Type of occupation (ISCO-08 classification): 1. Managers, 
2. Professionals, 3. Technicians and Associate Professionals, 
4. Clerical Support Workers, 5. Services and Sales  
Workers, 6. Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers, 
7. Craft and Related Trade Workers, 8. Plant and Machine 
Operators and Assemblers, 9. Elementary Occupations
Sector Sector of employment (NACE sections): 1. Agriculture (section 
A), 2. Industry (B–E), 3. Construction (F), 4. Trade (G), 
5. Transport (H), 6. Hotels and Restaurants (I), 7. Information 
and Communications (J), 8. Financial and Insurance Activities (K), 
9. Real Estate, Professional and Administrative Activities (L–N), 
10. Public Administration (O), 11. Education (P), 12. Health and 
Social Work Activities (Q), 13. Other services (R–U)
IMR Inverse mill ratio (sample selection coefficient)
CAPB Cyclically adjusted primary balance
GWG Gender wage gap (not adjusted for the labour market characteristics 
of men and women)
AGWG Adjusted gender wage gap (adjusted for the labour market 
characteristics of men and women)
TG, CG In the differences-in-differences model: treatment group, control 
group
T2010, T2013 In the differences-in-differences model: T2010 = initial year; 
T2013 = final year
AUS Country-level continuous variable describing austerity measures 
(expressed as CAPB changes)
AUS_L1 Country-level CAPB change lagged one year
AUS_L2 Country-level CAPB change lagged two years
AUS_L3 Country-level CAPB change lagged three years
AUS_d Country-level dummy variable describing austerity measures 
(coded = 1 if the CAPB change exceeded 0.5% and 0 otherwise)
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Acronym Definition
AUS_d_L1 Country-level dummy variable describing austerity measures 
(coded = 1 if the CAPB change exceeded 0.5% and 0 otherwise), 
lagged one year
AUS_d_L2 Country-level dummy variable describing austerity measures 
(coded = 1 if the CAPB change exceeded 0.5% and 0 otherwise), 
lagged two years
AUS_d_L3 Country-level dummy variable describing austerity measures 
(coded = 1 if the CAPB change exceeded 0.5% and 0 otherwise), 
lagged three years
TB_AUS_d
(same for L1, L2, 
L3)
For AUS_d = 1, country-level dummy variable identifying austerity 
measures that were predominantly tax- (increase) based [code as 
1 if the change in the cyclically adjusted structural revenue (as a 
% of GDP) was higher than the change in the cyclically adjusted 
structural expenditure; coded as 0 otherwise]
EX_AUS_d
(same for L1, L2, 
L3)
For AUS_d = 1, country-level dummy variable identifying austerity 
measures that were predominantly expenditure- (cuts) based (coded 
as 1 when TB_AUS_d = 0 and as 0 when TB_AUS_d = 1)
AUS_p_3_L1 Country-level continuous variable describing 3 years’ austerity plans 
(obtained as the sum of the CAPB change in years t-1, t-2 and t-3)
AUS_p_2_L1 Country-level continuous variable describing 3 years’ austerity plans 
(obtained as the sum of the CAPB change in years t-1 and t-2)
AUS_p_3_d_L1 Country-level dummy variable describing 2 years’ austerity plans 
(coded as 1 if the sum of the CAPB change in years t-1, t-2 and t-3 
exceeds 1%; 0 otherwise)
AUS_p_2_d_L1 Country-level dummy variable describing 2 years’ austerity plans 
(coded as 1 if the sum of the CAPB change in years t-1 and t-2 
exceeds 1%; 0 otherwise)
TB_ 
AUS_p_3_d_L1
EB_ AUS_p_3_d_L1
For AUS_p_3_d_L1 = 1, country-level dummy variable(s) describing 
3 years’ austerity plans predominantly tax-based or expenditure- 
(cuts) based
TB_ 
AUS_p_2_d_L1
EB_ AUS_p_2_d_L1
For AUS_p_3_d_L1 = 1, country-level dummy variable(s) describing 
2 years’ austerity plans predominantly tax-based or expenditure- 
(cuts) based
Table A1. (Continued)
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Table A3. Adjusted gender wage gap in EU-28 countries, 2010–13
Country Observations 2010 2011 2012 2013
AT Austria 17,827 0.144 0.14 0.149 0.131
BE Belgium 17,823 0.102 0.092 0.096 0.101
BG Bulgaria 17,896 0.183 0.202 0.173 0.167
CY Cyprus 16,168 0.260 0.249 0.213 0.184
CZ Czech Republic 26,381 0.242 0.242 0.243 0.239
DE Germany 39,421 0.13 0.158 0.143 0.145
DK Denmark 19,947 0.139 0.132 0.145 0.144
EE Estonia 18,625 0.278 0.31 0.327 0.313
EL Greece 11,434 0.142 0.099 0.088 0.057
ES Spain 32,202 0.140 0.138 0.153 0.115
FI Finland 29,865 0.150 0.159 0.148 0.129
FR France 35,742 0.086 0.106 0.075 0.108
HR Croatia 14,235 0.143 0.147 0.142 0.153
HU Hungary 33,236 0.141 0.147 0.134 0.126
IE Ireland 11,818 0.100 0.085 0.099 0.112
IT Italy 47,893 0.112 0.098 0.086 0.103
LT Lithuania 15,860 0.136 0.172 0.185 0.193
LU Luxembourg 18,335 0.091 0.078 0.060 0.069
LV Latvia 17,923 0.203 0.176 0.198 0.206
MT Malta 13,692 0.091 0.092 0.084 0.123
NL Netherlands 37,079 0.129 0.134 0.130 0.134
PL Poland 37,672 0.136 0.136 0.142 0.137
PT Portugal 17,811 0.154 0.16 0.150 0.173
RO Romania 18,488 0.129 0.116 0.105 0.095
SE Sweden 23,609 0.163 0.166 0.181 0.163
SI Slovenia 35,828 0.158 0.170 0.173 0.143
SK Slovakia 22,695 0.193 0.186 0.185 0.197
UK United Kingdom 17,827 0.147 0.109 0.116 0.128
All 677,702 0.165 0.166 0.162 0.160
Note: Our elaboration of EU-SILC data; all coefficients significant at 1% level.
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Table A4. Austerity in EU-28 (yearly CAPB change), 2007–13
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
AT Austria 0.23 −0.37 −0.27 −0.19 0.70 0.60 0.50
BE Belgium −0.77 −0.60 −2.09 −0.02 −0.20 0.60 0.40
BG Bulgaria −1.70 0.00 −3.80 1.00 0.70 1.80 −0.30
CY Cyprus 3.30 −2.70 −4.30 0.60 −0.10 1.20 3.90
CZ Czech Republic 0.73 −0.39 −0.99 1.19 1.50 1.30 1.40
DE Germany 0.67 0.04 0.37 −1.67 0.70 0.70 0.10
DK Denmark 0.48 −0.24 −2.22 −0.65 0.30 0.20 −0.30
EE Estonia −1.07 −0.33 3.21 0.83 0.10 −0.50 −0.20
EL Greece −0.96 −1.40 −2.21 6.20 5.20 3.90 0.80
ES Spain 0.02 −5.19 −3.77 1.37 1.20 3.60 1.70
FI Finland −0.41 −0.47 −1.48 −1.66 0.20 −0.20 −0.30
FR France −0.53 0.60 −2.07 −0.09 1.00 0.80 0.30
HR Croatia −0.40 −0.40 0.90 0.40 −1.30 3.70 0.60
HU Hungary 5.82 1.49 2.41 −1.59 −0.90 3.40 −0.10
IE Ireland −3.48 −4.12 −0.89 0.97 1.90 1.90 2.30
IT Italy 1.20 −0.46 −0.71 −0.17 0.30 2.70 −0.10
LT Lithuania −2.30 −1.00 1.30 2.20 −0.30 1.20 0.10
LU Luxembourg −0.19 0.93 −0.44 −1.80 1.20 1.20 −0.40
LV Latvia −0.90 −0.30 1.30 2.90 0.90 1.10 −1.10
MT Malta −0.50 −2.40 2.70 −1.70 1.40 −0.90 0.70
NL Netherlands −1.08 0.20 −1.80 −0.84 0.00 1.20 1.10
PL Poland −0.23 −1.25 −2.64 −0.39 2.20 2.20 0.40
PT Portugal 0.52 −0.66 −4.14 0.18 3.20 3.80 0.40
RO Romania −0.70 −3.30 0.00 3.20 2.60 0.70 1.50
SE Sweden 0.68 −0.05 0.72 −1.95 −0.60 −0.10 −0.30
SI Slovenia −0.32 −1.18 0.02 0.59 0.00 2.80 0.50
SK Slovakia −0.20 −0.60 −1.70 −0.20 3.20 0.70 2.00
UK United Kingdom −0.52 −0.27 −2.39 1.28 1.70 −0.90 1.90
Sources: AMECO database (2010 onwards) and our elaboration of AMECO database and OECD (2018) 
for 2007–09. Each column reports the CAPB change with respect to the previous year.
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Table A5. Adjusted gender wage gap change in the control (CG) and treatment (TG) groups
(1) (2) (3)
CG TG CG TG CG TG
Female −0.140*** −0.151*** −0.141*** −0.151*** −0.140*** −0.150***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Female_2013 −0.004 −0.048** −0.003 −0.048** −0.004 −0.057***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
Married 0.016 0.053*** 0.015 0.053*** 0.016 0.027**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 0.315*** 0.287*** 0.280*** 0.287*** 0.315*** 0.300***
(0.065) (0.090) (0.069) (0.090) (0.065) (0.083)
Age2 −0.024*** −0.024** −0.021*** −0.024** −0.024*** −0.024**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Health status −0.018** −0.033*** −0.020** −0.033*** −0.018** −0.050***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Secondary 
education
0.034 0.108*** 0.024 0.108*** 0.034 0.121***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024)
Tertiary 
education
0.089*** 0.195*** 0.070* 0.195*** 0.089*** 0.193***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028)
Permanent 0.412*** 0.515*** 0.415*** 0.515*** 0.412*** 0.481***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023)
Urban 0.021* 0.120*** 0.022* 0.120*** 0.021* 0.104***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 1.563*** 1.348*** 1.652*** 1.348*** 1.563*** 1.347***
(0.144) (0.226) (0.154) (0.226) (0.144) (0.205)
Observations 11,891 6,636 10,799 6,636 11,891 8,407
Adjusted R2 0.488 0.430 0.476 0.430 0.488 0.439
Notes: All estimations include country, year, country*year and occupation dummies; sample selection cor-
rection. Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for the variable and acronym descriptions. Columns: (1) 
treatment group: CZ, IE, ES, EL; control group: BE, DK, FI, SE, PL. (2) treatment group: CZ, IE, ES, EL; 
control group: DK, FI, SE, PL. (3) treatment group CZ, IE, ES, EL, PT; control group: BE, DK, FI, SE, PL.
Significance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table A6. Tax-based and expenditure-based austerity and gender wage gap (yearly and cumulative 
CAPB changes as a dummy variable), country fixed-effect estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female −0.159*** −0.158*** −0.162*** −0.159*** −0.156***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female*EB_AUS_d_L1 −0.007***
(0.003)
Female*TB_AUS_d_L1 −0.009***
(0.002)
Female*EB_AUS_d_L2 −0.021***
(0.003)
Female*TB_AUS_d_L2 −0.017***
(0.003)
Female*EB_AUS_d_L3 −0.022***
(0.003)
Female*TB_AUS_d_L3 0.003
(0.003)
Female*EB_AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.016***
(0.003)
Female*TB_AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.012***
(0.002)
Female*EB_AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.026***
(0.004)
Female*TB_AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.027***
(0.002)
Married 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.224***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Health status −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Secondary education 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tertiary education 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Full time −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Second job −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Permanent 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm size (11–49) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm size (over 50) 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.923*** 1.921*** 1.924*** 1.921*** 1.920***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Test (F) 
EB_AUS = TB_AUS
0.59 1.11 31.55*** 1.39 0.03
Observations 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696
Notes: All estimations include sector, occupation and country/year dummies; sample selection correction. 
Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for variable and acronym descriptions.
Significance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table A7. Austerity plans and sectorial gender segregation (no job variables), country fixed-effect 
estimation
Dependent variable: sectors 
ordered by increasing average wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.050*** −0.043*** −0.050*** −0.043***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female*AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.067***
(0.009)
Female*AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.103***
(0.010)
Female*EB_AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.104***
(0.014)
Female*TB_AUS_p_2_d_L1 −0.045***
(0.011)
Female*EB_AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.080***
(0.018)
Female*TB_AUS_p_3_d_L1 −0.110***
(0.011)
Married 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.630*** 0.629*** 0.630*** 0.629***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age2 −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.056***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Health status −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.044***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Secondary education 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.433***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Tertiary education 1.390*** 1.390*** 1.390*** 1.390***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Urban 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cut 1 0.700*** 0.699*** 0.698*** 0.699***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Cut 2 1.642*** 1.642*** 1.641*** 1.642***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Cut 3 2.594*** 2.593*** 2.593*** 2.593***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Cut 4 4.050*** 4.050*** 4.049*** 4.049***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Test (χ2) EB_AUS = TB_AUS 14.03*** 2.36
Observations 677,702 677,702 677,702 677,702
Pseudo-R2  0.0352  0.0352  0.0352  0.0352
Notes: All estimations include country/year dummies; sample selection correction. Columns (2) and (4) 
also include occupation dummies. Clustered SEs in parenthesis. See Table A1 for variable and acronym 
descriptions.
Significance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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